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April 1965] Recent Developments 
The Commerce Clause Held No Limitation to the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts-Wahl v. Pan 
American World Airways, Inc.* 
lll5 
Three wrongful death actions were brought in a federal district 
court in New York by United States citizens as survivors of passengers 
killed in the crash in Turkey of an airplane owned and operated 
by defendant Middle East Airlines (MEA). MEA is a Lebanese cor-
poration operating in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, whose 
United States sales are made by its general sales agent, Pan American 
World Ainvays, Inc. The court held that maintaining a New York 
office and entering into a general sales agency agreement with 
Pan American to promote travel on MEA of passengers originating 
in the United States were sufficient minimum contacts to justify 
the exercise of jurisdiction over MEA in New York for any legiti-
mate consequences of such activity. The court granted a motion for 
reargument, however, to hear the contention that the assertion of 
jurisdiction over MEA would constitute an undue burden on com-
merce with foreign nations in violation of the commerce clause. On 
reargument, held, affirmed. Although such an action in a state court 
may unconstitutionally burden commerce, when the action is 
brought in a federal court the burden cannot be unconstitutional 
since the commerce clause is a limitation upon state and not federal 
power. 
In Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co.,1 the United States Su-
preme Court declared invalid as an unreasonable burden on inter-
state commerce a state statute providing for service of process on a 
foreign railroad corporation. In announcing the doctrine that the 
negative implications of the commerce clause2 provided a possible 
defense to the assertion of jurisdiction, the Court stated that the 
orderly and effective administration of justice does not require a 
foreign carrier to submit to a suit by a nonresident of the forum 
state in a jurisdiction which is remote from where the cause of action 
• 227 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
I. 262 U.S. 312 (1923). See generally Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1075 (1936). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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arose and in which the carrier neither owns nor operates any 
facilities.3 
Decisions subsequent to Davis indicate that the Court is reluc-
tant to extend that decision beyond its facts.4 Thus, the commerce 
clause objection may be raised only against the maintenance of a 
suit on a cause of action arising outside of the forum state5 against 
a foreign corporation not operating in the forum state.6 Although the 
rationale of Davis extends to any legal entity in interstate commerce, 
it is questionable whether the defense is available other than to 
incorporated common carriers.7 Moreover, the fact that the plain-
tiff is a resident of the forum state is often sufficient to dispose of 
the defense.8 In addition, courts have had little difficulty in finding 
that the defendant carries on sufficient activities in the forum state 
to obviate the commerce clause objection.9 However, regardless of 
the concern in Davis about the dilatory effect on commerce caused 
by the necessity of removing trained employees from their jobs to 
appear as witnesses •in distant forums,10 later decisions indicate that 
there has been no incorporation of a requirement of distant wit-
nesses to limit this defense.11 Although this defense is of limited 
3. 262 U.S. at 317. 
4. See International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934); 
Denver &: R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 
278 U.S. 492 (1929); Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21 (1927); Missouri 
ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 
v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924). See generally Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corpora-
tions as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 17 MINN. L. REV'. 381 (1933); McGowan, 
Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL. L. REV. 875 (1939); Comment, 
45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1114-17 (1936); 44 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1931). 
5. See Farrier, supra note 4, at 393-95; McGowan, supra note 4, at 880-82; 
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1114-17 (1936). 
6. See generally Farrier, supra note 4, at 393-95 (1933); McGowan, supra note 4, 
at 880-82 (1939); 42 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1929). 
7. See Standard Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 538, 62 A.2d 454 
(1948), appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 930 (1949). But see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes 
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (semble); Uhlich v. Hilton Mobile 
Homes, 126 N.W.2d 813 (S.D. 1964). See generally McGowan, supra note 4, at 882; 
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1117 (1936). 
8. See Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 F.2d 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. 
denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947); Barnett v. Texas &: P. Ry., 145 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1944); 
Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Sullivan, 126 F.2d 433, 438-40 (1st Cir. 1942); Isenberg v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R., 82 F. Supp. 927, 928 (D. Mass. 1949). But see Zuber v. Pennsylvania 
R.R., 82 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., 278 S.W.2d 
749 (Mo. 1955). 
9. See Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra note 8; Barnett v. Texas & P. Ry., 
supra note 8; Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951); 
Western Smelting &: Ref. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 81 F. Supp. 494 (D. Neb. 1948); 
Gregg Co. v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot-Maatschappij N.V., 205 Misc. 
378, 128 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Munic. Ct. New York 1953). But see Overstreet v. Canadian 
Pac. Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 
supra note 8; Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); 
Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., supra note 8. 
10. 262 U.S. at 315. 
11. International Milling v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934); Denver & 
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vitality today,12 it continues to be verbalized13 and occasionally to 
be successfully invoked.14 
While recognizing its limited scope, the federal courts have not 
agreed on whether the defense of an undue burden on commerce 
can be asserted in the federal courts in an ordinary diversity action. 
One view is represented by Overstreet v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,15 
where a district court on the authority of Davis dismissed the suit 
as an unconstitutional burden on commerce. Another view was 
expressed in Wadell v. Green Textile Associates,16 where a district 
court found the defendant subject to jurisdiction conferred by the 
general diversity jurisdiction and venue statutes.17 Since it is clear 
that Congress has the constitutional power to burden commerce,18 
the court reasoned that congressional action in conferring jurisdic-
tion was an exercise of that power.19 A third view, expressed in Wahl, 
is that actions brought originally in federal courts on a diversity 
basis can never unduly burden commerce since the negative im-
plications of the commerce clause limit state but not federal power. 
It would seem difficult to maintain the position of Wadell thati 
merely because the action is proper under the general venue and 
jurisdiction provisions, Congress has exercised its power to burden 
commerce by permitting jurisdiction to be asserted over a foreign 
corporation having only a general sales agent in the forum state. 
In Baltimore i:t Ohio R.R. v. Kepner,20 the United States Supreme 
Court did hold that the venue provisions of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act21 compelled the federal courts to adjudicate any action 
that was proper under those provisions.22 The Court found, how-
R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932). See McGowan, supra note 4, at 886-87; 32 
COLUM. L. REV. 541 (1937). 
12. See 33 IND. L.J. 358 (1958). 
13. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 104 Ga. App. 200, 121 S.E.2d 4ll 
(1961); Barrett v. '.Boston &: Me. R.R., 104 N.H. 70, 178 A.2d 291 (1962); Fuss v. 
French Nat'l R.R., 35 Misc. 2d 680, 231 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
14. See, e.g., Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prod. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 
1961) (semble); Glaser v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d 539 (Law Div. 
1963). 
15. 152 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); accord, Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 F. 
Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948); Klepper v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 271 App. Div. 53, 62 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1946); 
Cotugno v. Union Pac. Ry., 12 Misc. 2d 235, 177, N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
16. 92 F. Supp. 738 (D.C. Mass. 1950); accord, Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 105 F. 
Supp. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1952): Brown v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 25 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.Y. 
1938). 
17. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1332, 1391 (1958). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Ferguson v. Ford Motor 
Co., 77 F. Supp. 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
19. 92 F. Supp. at 742. 
20. 314 U.S. 44 (1941). 
21. 35 Stat. 291 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958). 
22. 314 U.S. at 54. Compare Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
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ever, that Congress specifically intended those special venue pro-
visions to have that effect.23 On the contrary, the general diversity 
power given the federal courts has not been interpreted to compel 
adjudication.24 Significantly, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,25 the 
Court held that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins26 precludes 
federal courts from entertaining diversity actions barred in state 
courts by "door-closing" statutes.27 Although Congress has the power 
to permit the federal courts to adjudicate these suits,28 the grant of 
general diversity power has not been considered an exercise of this 
power.29 In terms of the implied effect of the general diversity 
provisions to override limitations on federal adjudicatory power, it 
would seem inconsistent with the approach in Woods, therefore, 
to limit the Davis doctrine by holding that the general diversity 
provisions are an exercise of congressional power to burden com-
merce by permitting suits in federal courts which Davis prohibits 
in state courts. 
The intimation in Wahl that the Davis doctrine is inapplicable 
in the federal courts because the commerce clause limits only state 
power30 is interesting, but unsupported. It is true that the Supreme 
Court has never considered a defense based on Davis in a case arising 
in the federal courts.31 However, the rationale of the Court in Davis 
23. 314 U.S. at 49-50. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as 
Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 15 n.21 
(1949). 
24. This was explicitly recognized in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 
(1947), a forum non conveniens case, in which the Court, discussing the Kepner line 
of cases, said that: "Those decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to 
other cases governed by the general venue statutes." Another example of the absence 
of compulsion under the general diversity provisions is the abstention doctrine, which 
prevents federal courts from hearing certain diversity cases in which the controlling 
state law is not clear. See, e.g., Louisiana Power &: Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 
360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
25. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
27. See also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). See generally Meador, State 
Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082, 1094-96 (1963). 
28. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
29. See generally Hill, ,The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 
541, 570 (1958); Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 
IND. L.J. 228, 249 (1964). 
30. 227 F. Supp. at 841. If the court is correct that the commerce clause limits 
ouly state power, an argnment that the federal courts would still have to follow 
state law under Erie is possible. If, in addition to the constitutional limitation, the 
state has an affirmative policy in its refusal to assert jurisdiction, for example the 
encouragement of limited activities in the state by foreign corporations, Erie would 
seem applicable. Certainly, there is no absolute due process right to sue in an 
American court. See Comment, 103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 830 (1955). In the absence of an 
affirmative state policy, however, it is clear that Erie would not preclude the federal 
courts from adjudicating the suit. Cf. Hill, supra note 29, at 570-71; Weintraub, supra 
note 29, at 249-51. 
31. In Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924), the Court held that 
the enforcement of a judgment obtained in a state court against a foreign railroad 
corporation in violation of the Davis doctrine could be enjoined by a federal court. 
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that the general submission of common carriers to suit will un-
reasonably obstruct commerce applies as well to the federal courts,82 
and the language of the Court broadly encompasses suits in both 
court systems.33 Moreover, since the power to regulate commerce 
is vested in the legislative branch of the federal government, 34 it 
would seem that the federal courts have no power to burden com-
merce. This question seems analogous to that question of executive 
power presented in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,35 
where there were at least four different views among the Justices 
of the Supreme Court as to whether the President could exerci~e 
any powers which fell within the legislative powers of Congress.36 
Nevertheless, each member of that Court considered ali powers of 
the President to regulate commerce to be delegated powers.37 It 
would seem clear by analogy, therefore, that the federal courts 
could not burden commerce in the absence of congressional dele-
gation of that power to them.38 The inability to find a specific intent 
in the general diversity provisions to burden commerce, as existed 
in Kepner, would seem to preclude finding such a delegation. 
Although its range of application has been narrowed,39 the com-
merce clause still remains a possible defense to jurisdiction, partic-
ularly appropriate to common carriers in foreign commerce. As a 
constitutional method of adjusting place of trial, analogous to the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, 40 its value has diminished with 
the expanded use of that doctrine.41 Nevertheless, as long as the 
Supreme Court does not view the Davis doctrine as discretionary, 42 
32. See Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923), where the 
Court took notice "that litigation in States and jurisdictions remote from that in 
which the cause of action arose entails absence of employees from their customary 
occupations." (Emphasis added.) 
33. Id. at 315-17. 
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
35. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
36. See Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case-Congress, the President and the Supreme 
Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 141, 177 (1952). Justices Black and Douglas considered the 
President powerless to act in the sphere of legislative powers of Congress without 
express authorization. See ibid. 
37. Id. at 175. See also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th 
Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). 
38. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), where the argument was made that the 
federal courts could not enjoin conduct interfering with interstate commerce unless 
authorized to do so by Congress. The Court sustained the injunction on the basis 
of a finding of congressional policy. See Kauper, supra note 36, at 148. 
39. See notes 4-14 supra and accompanying text. 
40. See Farrier, supra note 4, at 392. 
41. See generally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. 
REv. 380 (1947); Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 740 (1962). 
42. Mr. Justice Jackson viewed Davis as really a forum non conveniens case. 
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1, 31 (1945). See also Bickel, supra note 23, at 17 n.28. This view has been 
criticized. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908, 913 
(1947). 
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as is forum non conveniens, and as long as there is no specific con-
gressional authorization to burden commerce by permitting suits in 
the federal courts in these situations, the defense to the assertion of 
jurisdiction of an undue burden on commerce must be considered 
applicable in the federal courts. 
